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Abstract
Pricing pressure indices have recently been proposed as alternative screening devices for horizontal
mergers involving differentiated products. We extend the concept of Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP)
proposed by Farrell and Shapiro (2010) to two-sided markets. Examples of such markets are the
newspaper market, where the demand for advertising is related to the number of readers, and the
market for online search, where advertising demand depends on the number of users. The formulas
we derive are useful for screening mergers among two-sided platforms. Due to the two-sidedness
they depend on four sets of diversion ratios that can either be estimated using market-level demand
data or elicited in surveys. In an application, we evaluate a hypothetical merger in the Dutch daily
newspaper market. Our results indicate that it is important to take the two-sidedness of the market
into account when evaluating UPP.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, competition authorities have screened mergers based on the post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman-
Index (HHI) and the merger-related change in the HHI.1 This requires the definition of the relevant mar-
ket, which is usually done using a SSNIP test.2 However, following this practice may be problematic in
differentiated product markets because there substitutability is a matter of degree, while market definition
involves a zero/one decision of whether to include a given product in the relevant market or not. Hence,
any HHI-based analysis neglects information on the substitutability between products. Additionally, as-
suming the relevant market has been defined, the well-known positive relationship between HHI and
market power (or allocative inefficiency) holds perfectly only when firms chose quantities and products
are homogeneous.
As a response, pricing pressure indices have recently been proposed as alternative screening de-
vices for horizontal mergers involving differentiated products. The Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) mea-
sure – initially proposed by Farrell and Shapiro (2010) – and the Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index
(GUPPI) calculate the unilateral incentives to raise prices post-merger. These arise because post-merger,
the merged entity will internalize externalities one of the merging parties exercises on the other. These
are related to the pricing decision, as some of the lost sales of a product, following an increase of its
price, will be recaptured by an increase in sales in the other, now merged firm. The level of recapture
depends on the competitive closeness of the products. For example, if all customers who stop buying a
product that is initially sold by one firm will then buy a product that is sold by the other firm that merges
with the first firm, then the merger generates a strong incentive to raise prices, while there is no incentive
if then customers who stop buying from the first firm would buy from a different, third firm.
In this paper, we develop UPP measures for two-sided markets.3 Two-sided markets are markets in
which a firm sells two different products or services to two distinct groups of customers. An example
are newspapers, which cater both to readers and advertisers. A two-sided market is further characterized
by indirect network externalities between the two groups of consumers. These arise when the utility (or
increase in profits) obtained by a consumer (a firm) of one group depends on the number of consumers
(or firms) of the other group on the platform and the two groups of ccustomers cannot internalize these
externalities. In the case of newspapers, advertisers value advertising on a given newspaper more, the
1The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in the relevant market.
2SSNIP stands for Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price.
3See Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003, 2006), Evans (2003), Parker and van Alstyne (2005)
and Armstrong (2006).
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more readers the newspaper has. Conversely, it is not clear whether readers like, dislike or are indifferent
towards advertising in a newspaper, but for the market to be a two-sided one already the presence of one
indirect network effect is sufficient.
Also in two-sided markets UPP characterizes the incentive to unilaterally increase prices post-merger.
This incentive is related to the value of diverted sales that are recaptured by the other, now merged,
product post-merger and hence no longer lost to the merged entity. This value of diverted sales is different
in a merger involving two-sided platforms, as compared to a merger in a one-sided market and hence,
the one-sided UPP formula needs to be changed for the case of horizontal mergers in two-sided markets.
This is due to the presence of the indirect network externalities. To see this, consider a merger between
two newspapers and assume for the moment that both indirect network externalities are positive, hence
readers like advertising. Firstly, if one of the two newspapers increases the price it charges to advertisers,
demand for advertising in this newspaper will decrease. Some of the advertisers who are no longer
willing to purchase advertising space from the first newspaper will switch to the formerly competing,
now merged, second newspaper. These advertisers are no longer lost to the merged entity post-merger,
which generates incentives of the first newspaper to raise advertising prices post-merger. This part is
similar to the logic underlying the one-sided UPP measure. Secondly, however, the fact that by increasing
the advertising price, the first newspaper now attracts fewer advertisers in turn decreases its value also for
readers. Consequently, less readers will purchase the first newspaper. But some of those readers, who no
longer purchase the first newspaper following its increase of advertising rates, will switch to the second,
now merged, newspaper and are no longer lost to the merged entity post-merger. This second effect is
due to the indirect network externalities between the two consumer groups in a two-sided market and
needs to be taken into account when calculating UPP. We show how this can be done.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 draws on Kemp and Affeldt (2011) and reviews UPP in
one-sided markets. In Section 3 we extend the one-sided UPP formula for two-sided markets and present
an application using data on the Dutch newspaper market. Section 4 concludes.
2 UPP in One-Sided Markets
Pricing pressure indices characterize the unilateral effects of horizontal mergers involving differentiated
products by calculating the post-merger effects of marginal price increases above the pre-merger level.
Prior to the merger, if one of the merging firms raises its price by a small amount above the observed
equilibrium price, its profits remain unchanged. Post-merger, if the merged firm increases the price of
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one of its products, some of the lost sales will be recaptured by the second product (which used to be
a competing product). Therefore, this price increase is now profitable and thus likely to occur in the
absence of efficiency gains.
2.1 UPP
2.1.1 Original Formulation
The concept of Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) has recently been advocated by Farrell and Shapiro
(2010).4 The basic idea is that equilibrium prices satisfy the first order condition that a marginal increase
does not go along with increased profits. This changes when two or more firms merge. Then, evaluating
the new first order conditions at the optimal pre-merger prices, granting the firms an efficiency credit,
yields the Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) measure, which characterizes the incentives to raise prices.5
It is a measure of the unilateral incentives to increase prices post-merger in markets with differentiated
products. Thus, it assesses the likely unilateral effects of the merger. It is calculated for one product at a
time. Hence, there are as many UPPs as products involved in the merger.
A merger changes the first order conditions in two ways. The first effect creates upward pressure on
prices due to the loss of competition between the merging parties’ products—Farrell and Shapiro (2010)
call this “cannibalization”. The second effect leads to downward pressure on prices caused by merger-
related efficiencies (marginal cost decreases). The difference between these two effects is UPP. The UPP
measure is innovative because the authors propose a new way of expressing the incentives to increase
prices post-merger.
The underlying assumptions are Bertrand competition with differentiated products where firms set
prices independently pre-merger. Furthermore, Farrell and Shapiro (2010) assume that the merging firms
are single product firms. No assumptions are needed on the demand structure or pass-through rates since
UPP does not calculate the magnitude of the price change but only its direction. Finally, the measure
holds the prices of all other products, including the price of the other merging party’s product, constant,
following a price change by one of the merging parties.
4The concept of measuring the upward pressure on prices post-merger due to unilateral effects goes back to Werden (1996).
Werden (1996) develops a formula to calculate the level of merger-specific efficiencies needed in order for post-merger prices
not to increase, assuming Bertrand competition and merging firms with differentiated products. These efficiencies needed
depend on pre-merger margins of the two products of the merging firms, the two diversion ratios and pre-merger prices. Werden
(1996) finds that large (if not implausible) cost reductions are necessary to restore pre-merger prices in cases where the products
are highly differentiated (and thus margins are high) and the merging firms compete intensely prior to the merger. Another
predecessor to Farrell and Shapiro’s (2010) UPP concept is Shapiro (1996). In this paper, Shapiro describes how gross margin
and diversion ratio indicate whether a horizontal merger between differentiated product firms gives rise to incentives to increase
prices post-merger, assuming Bertrand competition and independent price setting by firms pre-merger.
5Here, we follow the exposition in Farrell and Shapiro (2010). See Section (2.1.2) for a formal derivation.
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This is the main difference to merger simulation. Since merger simulation calculates a post-merger
equilibrium, it takes price reactions by competitors into account. Simply put, UPP allows to look at the
change in pricing incentives from the internalization of the externality between firm 1 and firm 2 without
having to calculate a post-merger equilibrium, as is done in merger simulation. Post-merger, the now
merged entity will maximize joint profits. Considering firm 1 and firm 2 as different divisions within
the merged entity post-merger, headquarters want to impose joint profit-maximization. Headquarters can
reach this joint profit-maximization outcome by imposing an internal tax equal to the cannibalization
effect on each division and letting divisions continue maximizing individual profits. Since cannibaliza-
tion is a negative externality one product exerts on the other, it is comparable to a tax. By framing the
analysis in terms of a tax, the internalization of the externality post-merger (via the tax) can be treated as
an increase in division’s marginal costs. This increase in marginal costs is then directly comparable to
the decrease in marginal costs due to possible merger-specific efficiencies.
Considering a merger between firm 1 and firm 2 selling differentiated products 1 and 2 respectively,
Farrell and Shapiro (2010) define the UPP on product 1 as6
UPP1 = D12 (P2−C2)−E1C1,
where D12 is the diversion ratio from product 1 to product 2, P2 is the price for product 2, C2 is the
corresponding marginal cost, E1 is the percentage efficiency gain that is due to the merger, and C1 is the
marginal cost of producing one more unit of product 1. The diversion ratio is the fraction of customers
who buy product 2 when they stop buying product 1. It measures the impact on the quantity sold of
product 2 if the price of product 1 changes so much as to change the quantity sold of product 1 by one
unit and thereby reflects the degree of substitutability between product 1 and product 2.
Pre-merger, the two merging firms are competing with each other. If for example firm 1 increases its
price, firm 2 will capture part of the lost sales of firm 1, depending on how close substitutes their products
are. If firm 1 and firm 2 merge, customers switching from firm 1 to firm 2 following a price increase
of product 1 will no longer be lost to the merged entity. The merged firm will internalize this effect
post-merger. As stated above, Farrell and Shapiro (2010) view this as an opportunity cost or internal
tax, that headquarters of the merged entity impose on firm 1 and 2, which are considered as different
6Both the UPP and GUPPI (presented below) formula can be adapted to account for Cournot competition (see Moresi
(2009b)), bidding competition (see Moresi (2009a)) or multi-product merging firms (see Jaffe and Weyl (2011, 2012)). Jaffe
and Weyl (2012) generalize the idea to Generalized pricing pressure (GePP), which allows for different types of non-Betrand
conduct. They also discuss the relationship between pricing pressure, price changes and welfare changes.
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divisions of the merged entity post-merger. By imposing an internal tax, headquarters force the divisions
to internalize the externality their pricing decision exerts on the other division. This opportunity cost
or tax for firm (division) 1 is equal to D12 (P2−C2), where (P2−C2) is the pre-merger profit margin of
product 2 and hence represents the additional profits of firm 2 if it sells one more unit of its product. The
cannibalization part of the UPP formula thus indicates how much additional profits firm 2 gains if firm 1
increases its price so that its sales of product 1 fall by one unit.
Post-merger, firm 1 (now division 1) will internalize the effect of its pricing decisions on the profits
of firm 2 (now division 2). D12 (P2−C2) represents an additional opportunity cost which raises firm 1’s
marginal costs.7 This increase in marginal costs creates an incentive to raise the price for product 1. The
cannibalization effect is thus a measure of the gross upward pressure on the price of product 1 due to the
loss of competition between firm 1 and firm 2. The same obviously holds the other way around for firm
2. Thus, even though each division still maximizes individual profits post-merger, the imposition of the
internal tax increases marginal costs for the divisions, which will lead to higher prices and consequently
to joint profit-maximization.
It should be noted that D12 (P2−C2) only captures the first-round tax or opportunity cost. If firm 1
raises the price for product 1, firm 2 has an incentive to raise the price for product 2, which will increase
its margin and thus the opportunity cost or internal tax of firm 1.8 Hence, the ultimate effect of a merger,
even when rivals are assumed to keep their prices unchanged, is the outcome of an iterative procedure
where D12 (P2−C2) and D21 (P1−C1) are initially calculated as above, then the oligopoly re-equilibrates
and the internal taxes are recalculated. This process is repeated until convergence.
The second term in the formula for UPP1 measures merger-related efficiencies, where E1 is the effi-
ciency parameter applied to pre-merger marginal costs of product 1, for example 10%. Absent efficiency
gains, every horizontal merger between firms selling differentiated products, which are substitutes, cre-
ates an incentive to raise prices. A merger can however lead to efficiency gains that decrease marginal
costs. This creates a countervailing incentive to lower prices that can potentially offset the upward pric-
ing pressure created by the loss of competition between merging firms. Farrell and Shapiro (2010) do
not look at efficiencies in detail in their paper. They propose instead to credit every merger with some
default level of efficiencies in order to avoid flagging every merger between firms offering differentiated
products for further investigation. For illustrative purposes, they use a 10% efficiency credit. Neverthe-
7The opportunity cost is the loss in profits from product 2 as a result of a decrease in the price of product 1.
8Prices are strategic complements. The fact that firm 1 increases its price, increases the margin (P1−C1) in the formula for
UPP2, which increases the upward pricing pressure on firm 2.
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less, the authors note that this default credit must not be narrowly interpreted as marginal cost reductions
but could also contain for example an increase in product quality. Rather, it establishes a gross upward
pricing pressure threshold below which mergers will not be further investigated.
Whenever the UPP measure is positive (UPP> 0), the merger is likely to give rise to upward pricing
pressure and should be further investigated according to Farrell and Shapiro (2010). The higher the
diversion ratio (that is the closer substitutes product 1 and 2 are) and the higher the profit margin of
product 2, the higher UPP1 will be. The higher the merger-related efficiencies for product 1, the lower
UPP1 will be. Nevertheless, the test only gives a clear answer when the indices for both product 1 and
product 2, UPP1 and UPP2, respectively, are positive. Farrell and Shapiro suggest to further investigate
mergers where there is positive upward pricing pressure for at least one of the merging firms’ products.
2.1.2 Formal derivation
We now relate the UPP measure to profit maximization. Before the merger, firm 1 earns profits
pi1 = (P1−C1)Q1
and the optimal, observed price solves the first order condition
Q1 +(P1−C1)∂Q1∂P1 = 0. (1)
After the merger, prices are set as to maximize joint profits
pi1 +pi2 = (P1− (1−E1)C1)Q1 +(P2−C2)Q2,
where E1 is the efficiency credit in firm 1, and the derivative of those with respect to P1 is
Q1 +(P1− (1−E1)C1)∂Q1∂P1 +(P2−C2)
∂Q2
∂P1
.
This is the effect of a one unit price increase. We can re-express this in relative terms, relative to the
magnitude of the effect this change has on the quantity sold in firm 1 by dividing by −∂Q1/∂P1 (we
multiply by −1 because the sign of the own-price effect is negative). This gives
(
Q1 +(P1−C1)∂Q1∂P1
)/(
−∂Q1
∂P1
)
+
(
E1C1
∂Q1
∂P1
)/(
−∂Q1
∂P1
)
+(P2−C2) ∂Q2∂P1
/(
−∂Q1
∂P1
)
.
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At the pre-merger prices the first term is zero because of the first order condition (1). Recognizing that
the second ratio of derivatives is the diversion ratio D12 gives the UPP formula presented above.
2.1.3 Efficiency gains in the other firm
So far, only efficiency gains in firm 1 have been incorporated. One way to incorporate efficiency gains
E2 in firm 2 is to adjust the price cost margin in that firm, so that
UPP∗1 = D12 (P2− (1−E2)C2)−E1C1.
This generally increases the incentive for firm 1 to increase prices.9
2.1.4 GUPPI
In their comment on updating the US merger guidelines, Salop and Moresi (2009) propose to use the
Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index (GUPPI) to measure the upward pressure on post-merger prices.
Differently from UPP, GUPPI does not grant an efficiency credit. Rather, it expresses UPP in terms of
percentage margins.10
The assumptions for developing the GUPPI formula are the same as those of UPP. Hence, the formula
is based on Bertrand competition with differentiated products where firms set prices in a competitive
manner. Merging firms are single product firms and, as UPP, GUPPI holds the prices of all other products
constant, including the price of the other merging party’s product, following a price change by one of the
merging parties. Also as before, no assumptions are needed about the demand structure or pass-through
rates since the actual price change is not calculated.
Salop and Moresi (2009) define GUPPI for product 1 as
GUPPI1 = D12×m2,
where again D12 is the diversion ratio from product 1 to product 2 and m2 is the percentage pre-merger
price-cost margin of firm 2’s product 2. The thought experiment here is that firm 1 is initially indifferent
between raising the price marginally or not, or equivalently between losing one unit of sales or not. Post
9For this to hold we need that the products are substitutes so that D12 is positive, which we assume throughout.
10The use of GUPPI, even if not specifically named that way, is also proposed in the revised US Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines. See the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued August
19, 2010. Available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf (accessed June 2012).
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merger, if it loses one unit of sales, then it will gain the GUPPI times that unit in the other firm. The
difference to UPP is that the GUPPI formula measures the value of diversion of sales from product 1 to
product 2 in percentage terms instead of dollar terms. Specifically, it gives the percentage gain in firm
2 that is associated with losing sales in firm 1. Like UPP, GUPPI is the higher the higher the diversion
ratio between the merging firms’ products and the higher the pre-merger margin on product 2.
The GUPPI formula used in the US Merger Guidelines (see CRA (2010)), is slightly different from
this formula. It is given by
GUPPI+1 = D12×m2×
P2
P1
.
This GUPPI formula generalizes Salop and Moresi’s (2009) formula, which implicitly assumes equal
pre-merger prices for the two merging firms.
Since GUPPI only captures the internalization of cannibalization between the merging parties’ prod-
ucts post-merger, it will always be positive if the merging parties’ products are substitutes. Hence, if
GUPPI is to be used as a horizontal merger screening device, some threshold GUPPI level needs to be
specified below which the merger is considered not to give rise to substantial unilateral effects.11
2.2 Measuring Diversion Ratios in One-Sided Markets
The diversion ratio is the fraction of customers that buy product 2 when they stop buying product 1. It
can be measured directly using a survey among customers of firm 1, by asking them what they would do
if firm 1 would raise the price such that they would no longer buy product 1.
Equivalently, it is the effect of a marginal price increase of product 1 on demand for product 2,
11The revised US Horizontal Merger Guidelines state in this respect that a merger is unlikely to have significant unilateral
effects if the GUPPI is proportionally small. They do not define however what is meant by “small”. Nevertheless, following
what has usually been considered a small but significant non-transitory increase in price, this “small” could be interpreted as
meaning 5% (CRA, 2010). A GUPPI above 10% is, on the contrary, likely to result in more significant unilateral concerns. This
10% GUPPI has been derived by Moresi (2010) and is closely related to market definition. Moresi states that the two products
of the merging firms constitute a relevant market for themselves if the GUPPIs satisfy GUPPI1 ≥ 2s or GUPPI2 ≥ 2s, where
s is a small but significant non-transitory increase in price. In case one of the GUPPIs satisfies this relation, “a hypothetical
monopolist who would be the sole owner of the two products would find it profit-maximizing to raise the price of Product 1
alone (or Product 2 alone) by at least a SSNIP, even if one assumed that it did not also raise the price of the other product.”
(Moresi, 2010, p.7). In case s is 5%, as is currently used in the US guidelines, one arrives at the 10% threshold mentioned above.
According to Moresi (2010) this relation of the GUPPI to market definition is its main advantage over UPP. Nevertheless, it
has to be noted that the formula developed by Moresi (2010) relating the GUPPI to the SSNIP is based on a profit-maximizing
SSNIP not simply a just profitable SSNIP, i.e. to the US Hypothetical Monopolist test rather than the EU SSNIP-test. Further,
it relies on the additional assumptions of the merging firms facing linear demand and constant marginal costs. Hence, adopting
this formula implies giving up the advantage of GUPPI of not having to assume a particular demand system. Further, the formula
assumes a price increase for only one of the merging parties’ products. This means that the two products could constitute a
relevant market even if the two GUPPI measures are below 10% each.
9
divided by the marginal effect of this price change on demand for product 1, i.e.
D12 =−∂Q2/∂P1∂Q1/∂P1 .
See for example Epstein and Rubinfeld (2010). Here, we multiply by −1 to obtain a positive number–
merely a matter of notation. These marginal effects can be calculated from demand estimates that can in
principle be obtained from market level data. In practice, however, this is by no means straightforward
as it requires exogenous variation in prices.12
The diversion ratio is in a similar manner related to own- and cross-price elasticities with respect to
a change in the price of product 1,
η11 =−∂Q1/∂P1Q1/P1
and
η21 =−∂Q2/∂P1Q2/P1 ,
so that
D12 =
η21Q2
η11Q1
.
This formula may be useful if a policy maker has strong priors in terms of (cross) price elasticities, as
sales data are usually readily available. See also Werden (1998).
3 UPP in Two-Sided Markets
In two-sided markets, firm 1 sets two prices. Our empirical example below is for the daily newspaper
market, so we say that it sets PA1 on the advertising market and P
R
1 on the readership market.
12For multi-product firms is is sometimes convenient to express diversion ratios in terms of matrices. Here, we show how
this can be done based on estimates of marginal effect. Denote by Q1 and P1 the K1-vectors of quantities and prices of firm 1,
respectively, and by ∂Q1/∂P1 the K1×K1 matrix of derivatives of components of Q1 (in the rows) with respect to components
of P1 (in the columns). Likewise for the K2×K1 matrix of derivatives of Q2 with respect to P1, which we denote by ∂Q2/∂P′1.
Then, denoting by dgA the matrix which of the same size as A but contains only the diagonal elements of A on its own diagonal,
the K1×K2 matrix of diversion ratios is
D12 =
(
dg
∂Q1
∂P′1
)−1(∂Q2
∂P′1
)′
.
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3.1 UPP
3.1.1 Formal derivation
As compared to one-sided markets, a firm now sets two prices, and each of these affect sales of firm 2 on
both market sides. In this section, we develop UPP measures taking this into account. To see that this is
more complex, suppose firm 1 increases PA1 , where the superscript "A" denotes the advertising side (so
that PA1 is the advertising price set by firm 1) and the superscript "R" will denote the readership side (so
that PR1 is the subscription price set by firm 1), so that Q
A
1 decreases by one unit. Then, this decrease of
QA1 also decreases Q
R
1 (if the indirect network externality is positive, so more generally, it changes Q
R
1 ).
The additional profits of firm 2 are then the recaptured advertisers times the margin on advertisers. This
is the same as in a one-sided market, except that now there are in addition feedbacks between the two
market sides. These arise because for given prices the amount of advertising demanded depends on the
number of readers, which depends on the amount of advertising, which again depends on the number of
readers, and so on. In addition to the recaptured advertisers, and to the effect that is similar to the one
in a one-sided market, firm 1 now also internalizes the recaptured readers in firm 2 times the margin on
readers. A similar reasoning applies to the effect of an increase in PR1 . In the following, we derive UPP
measures for two-sided markets.
In two-sided markets, quantities on one market side are functions of prices on that same market side
and quantities on the other market side. In the context of the newspaper industry, this means that the
amount of advertising demanded is a function of the advertising price and the number of readers. In
the following, as first order conditions involve derivatives of quantities with respect to prices, it will be
useful to work with the reduced form quantities as functions of prices on both market sides. That is, to
work with the implied advertising demand, say, as a function of all advertising prices and all readership
prices. For developing an intuition it is instructive to imagine an iterative procedure in which one starts
with known demands as functions of prices and quantities and then updates advertising and subscription
demand, holding prices constant throughout, and using last iteration’s quantities on the respective other
market side.13
In the following, we denote these reduced forms for quantities as functions of prices only with hats.
13In practice, one can start with some initial guess for the quantities, e.g. the observed quantities, and iterate until conver-
gence. A sufficient condition for the set of quantities for given prices to be unique is that the mapping that is defined by the
updated quantities in iteration i+2 relative to iteration i possesses the properties of the mapping used in the appendix of Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), namely that the derivative with respect to the own quantity is positive and that the sum of the
derivatives on the same market side is less than 1. Then, this is a contraction mapping with modulus less than 1 and hence
the quantities are unique provided that some boundary conditions hold. It is straightforward to verify numerically that these
conditions hold. They do in our application.
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We show in Section 3.2 below how derivatives of those quantities with respect to prices can be obtained
by applying the implicit function theorem.
Before the merger firm 1 earns profits
pi1 =
(
PA1 −CA1
)
QˆA1 +
(
PR1 −CR1
)
QˆR1
and the optimal, observed prices solve the first order conditions
QˆA1 +
(
PA1 −CA1
) ∂ QˆA1
∂PA1
+
(
PR1 −CR1
) ∂ QˆR1
∂PA1
= 0 (2)
QˆR1 +
(
PA1 −CA1
) ∂ QˆA1
∂PR1
+
(
PR1 −CR1
) ∂ QˆR1
∂PR1
= 0.
After the merger, these prices are set as to maximize joint profits
pi1 +pi2 =
(
PA1 − (1−EA1 )CA1
)
QˆA1 +
(
PR1 − (1−ER1 )CR1
)
QˆR1 +
(
PA2 −CA2
)
QˆA2 +
(
PR2 −CR2
)
QˆR2 ,
incorporating efficiency credits EA1 and E
R
1 . The derivatives of those with respect to P
A
1 and P
R
1 are
QˆA1 +
(
PA1 − (1−EA1 )CA1
) ∂ QˆA1
∂PA1
+
(
PR1 − (1−ER1 )CR1
) ∂ QˆR1
∂PA1
+
(
PA2 −CA2
) ∂ QˆA2
∂PA1
+
(
PR2 −CR2
) ∂ QˆR2
∂PA1
QˆR1 +
(
PA1 − (1−EA1 )CA1
) ∂ QˆA1
∂PR1
+
(
PR1 − (1−ER1 )CR1
) ∂ QˆR1
∂PR1
+
(
PA2 −CA2
) ∂ QˆA2
∂PR1
+
(
PR2 −CR2
) ∂ QˆR2
∂PR1
.
Dividing by the negative of the own-price effect, as before, gives
(
QˆA1 +
(
PA1 − (1−EA1 )CA1
) ∂ QˆA1
∂PA1
+
(
PR1 − (1−ER1 )CR1
) ∂ QˆR1
∂PA1
)/(
−∂ Qˆ
A
1
∂PA1
)
+
(
PA2 −CA2
) ∂ QˆA2
∂PA1
/(
−∂ Qˆ
A
1
∂PA1
)
+
(
PR2 −CR2
) ∂ QˆR2
∂PA1
/(
−∂ Qˆ
A
1
∂PA1
)
and
(
QˆR1 +
(
PA1 − (1−EA1 )CA1
) ∂ QˆA1
∂PR1
+
(
PR1 − (1−ER1 )CR1
) ∂ QˆR1
∂PR1
)/(
−∂ Qˆ
R
1
∂PR1
)
+
(
PA2 −CA2
) ∂ QˆA2
∂PR1
/(
−∂ Qˆ
R
1
∂PR1
)
+
(
PR2 −CR2
) ∂ QˆR2
∂PR1
/(
−∂ Qˆ
R
1
∂PR1
)
.
Evaluating those expressions at the pre-merger prices amounts to substituting in the respective equations
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in (2). This gives
UPPA1 = D
AA
12
(
PA2 −CA2
)
+DAR12
(
PR2 −CR2
)−EA1CA1 −DAR11 ER1CR1 (3)
UPPR1 = D
RA
12
(
PA2 −CA2
)
+DRR12
(
PR2 −CR2
)−DRA11 EA1CA1 −ER1CR1 ,
where
DAA12 =
∂ QˆA2
∂PA1
/(
−∂ Qˆ
A
1
∂PA1
)
DAR12 =
∂ QˆR2/∂PA1
∂ QˆR1/∂PA1
∂ QˆR1/∂PA1
∂ QˆA1/∂PA1
=
∂ QˆR2
∂PA1
/(
−∂ Qˆ
A
1
∂PA1
)
DRA12 =
∂ QˆA2/∂PR1
∂ QˆA1/∂PR1
∂ QˆA1/∂PR1
∂ QˆR1/∂PR1
=
∂ QˆA2
∂PR1
/(
−∂ Qˆ
R
1
∂PR1
)
DRR12 =
∂ QˆR2
∂PR1
/(
−∂ Qˆ
R
1
∂PR1
)
DAR11 =
∂ QˆR1
∂PA1
/(
−∂ Qˆ
A
1
∂PA1
)
DRA11 =
∂ QˆA1
∂PR1
/(
−∂ Qˆ
R
1
∂PR1
)
.
These are diversion rations within and across market sides, respectively within and across firms. The
terms ∂ QˆR1/∂PA1
/
∂ QˆA1/∂PA1 and ∂ QˆA1/∂PR1
/
∂ QˆR1/∂PR1 “translate” the effect of the price increase on
one side into one on the other side. They respectively represent the change in readers of firm 1 as a
result of the change of one unit in advertisers of firm 1 and the change in advertisers of firm 1 as a result
of the change of one unit in readers of firm 1.14
14For multi-product firms they are, in matrix notation,
DAA12 =
(
dg
∂ QˆA1
∂PA′1
)−1(
∂ QˆA2
∂PA′1
)′
DAR12 =
(
dg
∂ QˆA1
∂PA′1
)−1(
dg
∂ QˆR1
∂PA′1
)(
dg
∂ QˆR1
∂PA′1
)−1(
∂ QˆR2
∂PA′1
)′
=
(
dg
∂ QˆA1
∂PA′1
)−1(
∂ QˆR2
∂PA′1
)′
DRA12 =
(
dg
∂ QˆR1
∂PA′1
)−1(
dg
∂ QˆA1
∂PR′1
)(
dg
∂ QˆA1
∂PR′1
)−1(
∂ QˆA2
∂PR′1
)′
=
(
dg
∂ QˆR1
∂PA′1
)−1(
∂ QˆA2
∂PR′1
)′
DRR12 =
(
dg
∂ QˆR1
∂PR′1
)−1(
∂ QˆR2
∂PR′1
)′
DAR11 =
(
dg
∂ QˆA1
∂PA′1
)−1(
∂ QˆR1
∂PA′1
)′
DRA11 =
(
dg
∂ QˆR1
∂PA′1
)−1(
∂ QˆA1
∂PR′1
)′
.
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3.1.2 Efficiency gains in the other firm
As before, efficiency gains in firm 2 can be incorporated by adjusting the margins on both sides of the
market. Then,
UPPA∗1 = D
AA
12
(
PA2 −CA2
(
1−EA2
))
+DAR12
(
PR2 −CR2
(
1−ER2
))−EA1CA1 −DAR11 ER1CR1
UPPR∗1 = D
RA
12
(
PA2 −CA2
(
1−EA2
))
+DRR12
(
PR2 −CR2
(
1−ER2
))−DRA11 EA1CA1 −ER1CR1 .
3.1.3 GUPPI
For GUPPI, instead of granting efficiency credits, we express everything in terms of margins, which
gives
GUPPIA+1 = D
AA
12 m
A
2 ×
PA2
PA1
+DAR12 m
R
2 ×
PR2
PA1
GUPPIR+1 = D
RA
12 m
A
2 ×
PA2
PR1
+DRR12 m
R
2 ×
PR2
PR1
,
where
mA2 =
(
PA2 −CA2
)
PA2
mR2 =
(
PR2 −CR2
)
PR2
.
3.2 Measuring Diversion Ratios in Two-Sided Markets
In two-sided markets, a price change in, say, PA1 affects all demands. This is because there are feedback
effects so that the demand for advertising in firm 2 depends on all advertising quantities and circulation,
which again depends on amounts of advertising and thereby on advertising prices. For the UPP formula
developed above, the relevant sales in firm 2 are QA2 =Q
A
2 (P
A,QR) and QR2 =Q
R
2 (P
R,QA) and the reduced
form quantities as functions of prices are QA2 = Qˆ
A
2 (P
A,PR) and Q2 = QˆR2 (P
A,PR). To some extent, when
market level or scanner data are available, one can choose whether to estimate the original demand
equations (i.e. the ones without the “hat”) or the reduced form equations (i.e. the ones with the “hat”).15
When instead data are elicited in surveys it is only possible to ask questions which provide information
15In general, this is likely to depend on the type, quality and quantity of available data, including instruments.
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on the direct demand equations.16
Hence, we now show how one can calculate the derivatives of those with respect to prices in firm 1
that are needed to calculate diversion ratios in a similar fashion as in a one-sided market.17
For this, stack all quantities and prices into the vectors QA, QR, PA and PR, respectively. Then,
applying the implicit function theorem gives
 ∂ QˆA/∂PA′ ∂ QˆA/∂PR′
∂ QˆR/∂PA′ ∂ QˆR/∂PR′
=−
 −I ∂QA/∂QR′
∂QR/∂QA′ −I

−1 ∂QA/∂PA′ 0
0 ∂QR/∂PR′
 ,
where the quantities on the right hand side are marginal effects that one can obtain from the original
demand estimates. Except possibly for the need to pay attention to the structure of the matrixes above,
we believe the implicit function theorem is straight-forward to implement in practice, once the relevant
estimates are available.18,19
3.3 A tempting practical approximation to the two-sided UPP measures
We have seen that the difference between one-sided and two-sided UPP measures is on the one hand the
incorporation of effects on the respective other market side and on the other hand the adjustment of the di-
version ratios to take into account feedbacks between the two sides. A tempting practical approximation
to (3) could be
UPPA1 ≈ D˜AA12
(
PA2 −CA2
)
+ D˜AR12
(
PR2 −CR2
)−EA1CA1 − D˜AR11 ER1CR1 (4)
UPPR1 ≈ D˜RA12
(
PA2 −CA2
)
+ D˜RR12
(
PR2 −CR2
)− D˜RA11 EA1CA1 −ER1CR1 ,
16Intuitively, in our newspaper example below, one could ask a reader how she would react to a change in the cover price of
the newspaper or in the amount of advertising in the newspaper but would not be able to ask how she would react to a change
in the price of an advertising slot on the newspaper. Similarly, for advertisers.
17See also Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (2010).
18In fact, the matrixes above are block-matrixes, in which each block has dimensions K×K, where K is the number of
products of the merging platforms.
19Whereas the application of the implicit function theorem is straight-forward, it requires that the reduced form demand
functions above exist. The possibility that they do not exist has been highlighted by White and Weyl (2011), who propose
to solve the issue by assuming firms charge insulating tariffs, i.e. price schedules conditional on quantities on the other side
of the market. This guarantees also the existence of a unique equilibrium. We believe however that, while this theoretical
issue would be more relevant in a full merger simulation, it is of lesser importance in the current context, as upward pricing
pressure is already an approximation. For instance, the existence of the reduced demand equations above is guaranteed, if the
indirect network effects are non-explosive, whenever the original demands on the two sides are linear or log-linear. Moreover,
in the forthcoming revision of Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (2010), the authors show how, with the most commonly used
functional forms, there exist testable conditions on the estimated parameters such that the above reduced form equations and a
unique post-merger equilibrium exist.
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where
D˜AA12 =
∂QA2
∂PA1
/(
−∂Q
A
1
∂PA1
)
D˜AR12 = −
∂QR2
∂QA1
D˜RA12 = −
∂QA2
∂QR1
D˜RR12 =
∂QR2
∂PR1
/(
−∂Q
R
1
∂PR1
)
D˜AR11 =−
∂QR1
∂QA1
D˜RA11 =−
∂QA1
∂QR1
are approximations to the diversion ratios.
The approximations in (4) are tempting as they are equal to the one-sided UPP measures plus adjust-
ment terms that involve estimates of the network effects. The main advantage of these approximations
is that they do not require to use the implicit function theorem to recover the “correct” diversion ratios.
Although the application of the implicit function theorem is quite straight-forward, in many cases using
the approximations in (4) may be quicker. This comes however at the cost of an additional simplifica-
tion. The approximated diversion ratios take into account only the direct effect of an increase in prices,
holding the quantities on the other side fixed, and do not account for the feedbacks from one side of
the market to the other. In other words, they are derived from the direct elasticities rather than the full
elasticities which incorporate the indirect network effects. Clearly, the higher the network effects the
worse the approximation.20
3.4 An example
We now apply these concepts to a hypothetical merger in the Dutch daily newspaper market. Filistrucchi,
Klein, and Michielsen (2012) describe this market in detail and estimate demand for advertising and
newspaper subscriptions and recover marginal costs. The reader is referred to that paper for a detailed
description of the market and details on the estimation procedure. Here, we use these estimates to
calculate the measures described above, both using the formulas for one-sided and for two-sided markets.
20Note that what matters is in practice the product of the two estimated network effects, e.g. in our newspaper example below
what matters is the product of the effect of an additional reader on advertisers’ demand times the effect of an additional ad on
readers’ demand. This is the “module” which is repeated in a sort of multiplier effect due to the two-sidedness of the market
that is “applied” to the direct elasticities.
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The hypothetical merger we investigate is between publisher 1, De Persgroep, owning the Algemeen
Dagblad (AD1), NRC Handelsblad (NRC), nrc.next (NRN), Het Parool (PAR), Trouw (TRO) and de
Volkskant (VOL) and publisher 2 owning De Gooi- en Eemlander (GOO), Haarlems Dagblad (HAR),
Leidsch Dagblad (LEI), Noordhollands Dagblad (NOR) and De Telegraaf (TEL). AD1 is a national-
level newspaper with regional editions, NRC is a business-oriented national level newspaper, NRN is the
corresponding evening edition, and PAR, TRO and VOL are other national level newspaper. The other
group of newspapers owned by publisher 2, the Telegraaf group, consists of the regional level newspapers
GOO, HAR, LEI and NOR, and the tabloid TEL. A priori, it is not clear whether these newspapers all
operate in the same market because the newspapers owned by publisher 1 are mainly higher quality
national level newspapers and the newspapers owned by publisher 2 are regional level newspapers and
one tabloid national level newspaper.
Table 1 summarizes the estimates of demand elasticities, prices and recovered marginal costs that we
will use in the following by means of averages within groups of newspapers owned by the two publishers.
We proceed under the assumption that they are correct. The main challenge in practice is often to obtain
robust estimates that the competition authorities and the merging parties more or less agree on (van
Damme, Filistrucchi, Gerardin, Keunen, Klein, Michielsen, and Wileur, 2010). Here, we ignore this
issue, as our objective is to show how, starting from a set of estimates that are taken as given, conclusions
may change when the two-sided nature of the market is correctly taken into account.
The first part of the top panel of the table shows elasticities of advertising demand with respect to
the advertising price, holding the number of readers constant, and with respect to the number of readers,
holding the advertising prices constant. These are based on a specification in which the demand for
the amount of advertising, measured in column millimeters, is of constant elasticity with respect to the
advertising per reader. Therefore, the elasticity with respect to the price is minus one times the elasticity
with respect to the number of readers. It is estimated to be −0.70 and 0.70, respectively, and imposed to
be the same for all newspapers.
The second part of the top panel shows elasticities of advertising demandwith respect to the advertis-
ing price and the subscription price, holding the respective other price fixed. We obtain those as described
in Section 3.2. The former is similar to the one reported before. The latter varies across newspapers and
is about−1.3 on average. This shows that newspaper prices have a larger effect on advertising quantities,
through reduced circulation, than advertising prices have.
On the subscription side, holding the amount of advertising fixed, using a Logit model that is esti-
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Table 1: Market characteristics
group 1 group 2
average elasticities for advertising demand
advertising price (∂QAj /∂PAj )/(QAj /PAj ) -0.70 -0.70
circulation (∂QAj /∂QRj )/(QAj /QRj ) 0.70 0.70
average elasticities for advertising demand incorporating feedback
advertising price (∂ QˆAj /∂PAj )/(QAj /PAj ) -0.72 -0.74
subscription price (∂ QˆAj /∂PRj )/(QAj /QRj ) -1.42 -1.22
average elasticities for subscription demand
subscription price (∂QRj /∂PRj )/(QRj /PRj ) -1.96 -1.65
amount advertising (∂QRj /∂QAj )/(QRj /QAj ) 0.04 0.07
average elasticities for subscription demand incorporating feedback
advertising price (∂ QˆRj /∂PRj )/(QRj /PRj ) -0.88 -1.36
subscription price (∂ QˆRj /∂PAj )/(QRj /PAj ) -2.02 -1.74
prices and marginal costs
advertising price per column millimeter PAj 7.10 3.95
marginal cost advertising CAj 4.09 2.27
subscription price per year PRj 263.82 241.84
marginal cost subscription CRj 121.00 94.34
mated at the municipality level (Berry, 1994), we find a price elasticity of about −2 on average. Adver-
tising is estimated to have a small but positive effect on circulation, with an elasticity of about 0.05 on
average, so that the market is found to be characterized by two indirect positive network effects between
the demand for advertising and the demand for readership.
The bottom panel shows prices and marginal costs. Advertising prices are per column millimeter
and reflect the acquisition and typesetting costs for an additional column millimeter of advertising. Here,
for simplicity, we ignore additional printing costs, as modeled by Fan (2012), that would also depend on
circulation. All prices are in in year-2002 euros. The initial situation is the one at the end of 2009.
In Table 2, we present summary statistics of the estimated diversion ratios. Each row is for a partic-
ular product and we present the sum of the diversion ratios across competing products, when consumers
stop buying a particular product. The table contains estimates that do not and do, respectively, take in-
direct network effects into account. The top part of the first of the three columns is zero because the
econometric model in Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (2012) assumes that cross-effects are zero on
the advertising market.21 Then, one-sided diversion ratios on that side of the market are automatically
21An assumption that is commonly made in this context, see e.g. Rysman (2004), Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009)
and Fan (2012). It means that, holding the number of subscribers constant, advertising demand in newspaper i depends only on
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zero once the quantity of readers is held constant. Still we can see that two-sided diversion ratios are
positive. This is due to the fact that when the price of an advertisement in a given newspaper is raised
demand for advertisements in that newspapers drops. The drop in advertising demand due to a drop
in advertising prices negatively affects the sales of that newspaper and increases the sales of the other
newspaper even though no ad sales are directly diverted to the other newspapers. This is summarized
in the top part of the third column. However the changes in the readers demand in turn decrease further
the sales of advertising on that newspaper but increase also the sales of advertising on the other newspa-
pers. The two-sided diversion ratios in the top of the second column also take this effect into account.
But since readers value advertising only very little, two-sided diversion ratios are still small and hardly
different from the one-sided ones.
A similar effect is at play in the lower part of the table, and also here the difference in the diver-
sion ratios between column one and column three is small. To summarize, it is small for both sides
because one of the two network effects is small and products on the advertising market are assumed to
be independent once subscription demand is held constant.
We have also calculated the approximations to the two-sided diversion ratios in Section 3.3 and they
are very similar to the exact ones for which we report summary statistics here. This is likely due to
the small network effect from advertising to readers, by which the effect of the feedback loop described
above is relatively small here.
Table 3 shows measures of one-sided UPP, ignoring the presence of indirect network effects. The
cannibalization effect, denoted by GUPP, is zero on the advertising side, as diversion ratios are zero when
the two-sidedness of the market is ignored, since direct cross-price elasticities are zero. Therefore, once
we grant a 10 percent efficiency credit (denoted by EC), UPP is negative, suggesting downward pricing
pressure. Adjusting for efficiency gains in the other firm does not change UPP because diversion ratios
are zero. For the same reason, GUPPI is zero, and the efficiency credit that is necessary to achieve UPP
equal to zero (NEC) is zero.
On the subscription side, the numbers suggest that there is upward pricing pressure coming from
NRN and PAR in firm 1 and all newspapers in firm 2. This, however, as we ignore indirect network
effects, does not take into account that firms may actually be less inclined to raise prices on that side
because a decreased circulation will also lower advertising demand. Hence, it is important to take this
into account.
the price of advertising in that newspaper, and not in others. Rysman (2004) argues that this is a reasonable assumption once
readers single-home.
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Table 2: Diversion ratios
without network effects with network effects
same side advertising subscriptions
advertising: first firm with newspapers . . .
AD1 0.00 0.01 0.02
NRC 0.00 0.01 0.01
NRN 0.00 0.00 0.01
PAR 0.00 0.00 0.00
TRO 0.00 0.00 0.00
VOL 0.00 0.01 0.01
. . . merging with the second firm with newspapers . . .
GOO 0.00 0.00 0.00
HAR 0.00 0.00 0.00
LEI 0.00 0.00 0.00
NOR 0.00 0.00 0.00
TEL 0.00 0.01 0.01
subscriptions: first firm with newspapers . . .
AD1 0.13 0.13 0.13
NRC 0.11 0.12 0.12
NRN 0.11 0.11 0.11
PAR 0.07 0.07 0.07
TRO 0.10 0.10 0.10
VOL 0.05 0.02 0.06
. . . merging with the second firm with newspapers . . .
GOO 0.08 0.06 0.08
HAR 0.07 0.03 0.07
LEI 0.10 0.17 0.10
NOR 0.07 0.06 0.08
TEL 0.08 0.05 0.09
Each row i shows the sum of the diversion ratios, over products j of the other firm, from
the advertising side of firm 1 and 2, respectively, in the top panel, and on the readership
side in the bottom panel. The columns correspond to the effect on either advertising or
readership revenues. That is, the cells contain values of ∑ jD·Ai j in the first (top panel) and
second column and ∑ jD·Ni j in the first (bottom panel) and third column.
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Table 3: One-sided UPP measures
GUPP EC UPP UPP∗ GUPPI+ GUPPI∗+ NEC
advertising: first firm with newspapers . . .
AD1 0.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NRC 0.00 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
NRN 0.00 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
PAR 0.00 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
TRO 0.00 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
VOL 0.00 -0.44 -0.44 -0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00
. . . merging with the second firm with newspapers . . .
GOO 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
HAR 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
LEI 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
NOR 0.00 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
TEL 0.00 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00
subscriptions: first firm with newspapers . . .
AD1 7.17 -10.70 -3.52 -2.93 0.03 0.03 0.07
NRC 10.48 -17.68 -7.20 -6.40 0.03 0.04 0.06
NRN 9.15 -5.24 3.91 4.61 0.05 0.05 0.17
PAR 13.01 -10.31 2.71 3.72 0.05 0.06 0.13
TRO 10.06 -15.25 -5.19 -4.41 0.03 0.04 0.07
VOL 11.03 -13.42 -2.39 -1.56 0.04 0.04 0.08
. . . merging with the second firm with newspapers . . .
GOO 18.27 -9.42 8.85 10.62 0.07 0.08 0.19
HAR 15.95 -9.04 6.91 8.45 0.07 0.07 0.18
LEI 15.45 -9.04 6.42 7.86 0.07 0.07 0.17
NOR 9.31 -8.70 0.61 1.48 0.04 0.04 0.11
TEL 14.21 -10.98 3.23 4.49 0.06 0.06 0.13
Each row i in this table corresponds to a newspaper belonging to one of the two merging parties. The
columns in this table show GUPP, which is the sum of the diversion ratios from such a newspaper i
over newspapers j in the other firm, multiplied by the markups in the other firms, ∑ jDi j(Pj −C j);
EC, which is a corresponding 10 percent efficiency credit for newspaper i, 0.1 ∗Ci; UPP, which is
the UPP measure for newspaper i that is given by the difference between the two; UPP∗, which is
the same, only that now also efficiency gains in i are taken into account, so UPP∗i j = ∑ jDi j(Pj−0.9 ·
C j); GUPPI+ = ∑ jDi j(Pj −C j)/Pi ; GUPPI∗+ that takes efficiency gains in i in a similar fashion
into account as UPP∗, so GUPPI∗+ = ∑ jDi j(Pj − 0.9 ·C j)/Pi; and NEC: the efficiency credit for
newspaper i on the same side that is necessary to completely offset the UPP, ∑ jDi j(Pj−C j)/Ci.
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Table 4: Two-sided UPP measures
GUPP EC UPP UPP∗ GUPPI+ GUPPI∗+ NEC
advertising: first firm with newspapers . . .
AD1 2.60 0.09 2.69 2.87 0.15 0.16 0.26
NRC 1.56 0.50 2.06 2.16 0.21 0.23 0.37
NRN 0.79 -0.12 0.67 0.72 0.20 0.22 0.35
PAR 0.22 0.04 0.25 0.27 0.07 0.08 0.13
TRO 0.53 0.18 0.71 0.74 0.15 0.16 0.27
VOL 2.01 0.25 2.26 2.39 0.26 0.28 0.45
. . . merging with the second firm with newspapers . . .
GOO 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
HAR 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
LEI 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02
NOR 0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05
TEL 1.94 0.07 2.01 2.18 0.15 0.16 0.26
subscriptions: first firm with newspapers . . .
AD1 7.74 -10.43 -2.68 -2.04 0.03 0.03 0.07
NRC 11.35 -17.43 -6.08 -5.20 0.04 0.04 0.06
NRN 9.84 -5.17 4.66 5.43 0.05 0.05 0.19
PAR 14.65 -10.11 4.54 5.73 0.06 0.06 0.14
TRO 10.95 -15.15 -4.19 -3.33 0.04 0.04 0.07
VOL 11.91 -13.18 -1.27 -0.35 0.04 0.05 0.09
. . . merging with the second firm with newspapers . . .
GOO 19.11 -9.85 9.26 11.13 0.08 0.09 0.20
HAR 16.65 -9.04 7.61 9.23 0.07 0.08 0.18
LEI 16.27 -8.88 7.40 8.94 0.07 0.08 0.18
NOR 9.70 -8.46 1.24 2.16 0.04 0.04 0.11
TEL 15.01 -10.40 4.61 5.96 0.06 0.07 0.14
See notes to previous table. All measures are adjusted for indirect network effects as described in the
main text.
Table 4 shows the same measures but now adjusted for the presence of indirect network effects.22
Now, there is evidence for substantial UPP on the advertising side, independent of the measure that is
used. There is still evidence for UPP on the readership side, but comparing GUPPI across market sides
suggests that for the first firm UPP is actually bigger on the advertising side than on the readership side.
This effect can (does not necessarily have to) arise if advertisers care more about readers than readers
care about advertising, and for that reason firms would be more inclined to increase advertising prices.
This is also reflected in the efficiency credits that are necessary to offset UPP, which are reported in the
last column.23
Comparing Table 3 to Table 4 is informative about the difference in the conclusions one would draw
22The efficiency credit can now be negative because it involves across-market side effects.
23These are the efficiency credits necessary on the same market side as the UPP measure is calculated, respectively, assuming
that there is no efficiency credit on the other market side. In principle, this can be generalized to a weighted efficiency credit
where weights are given by, e.g., profit shares.
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when ignoring the two-sidedness of the market. Looking for instance at the bottom part of the column
for UPP in both tables one can see that UPP measures on the readers’ side do not change much when one
correctly takes into account the two-sided nature of the market. But looking instead at the top part of the
column one can see that UPP on the advertising market is detected only when the two-sided nature of the
market is taken into account. Since we saw in Table 2 that diversion ratios from advertising to advertising
do not change much when the two-sided nature of the market is taken into account, this effect is almost
completely due to the use of the correct formulas for the calculation of UPP in two-sided markets: there
are two parts in equation (3)—the first measures the effect of an increase in the advertising (readers) price
on advertising (readers) profits and the second one measures the effect of an increase in the advertising
(readers) price on readers (advertisers) profits. Using a one-sided market formula ignores this second
part and may lead to wrong conclusions, in this case that there is no UPP on the advertising side, while
in fact there is.
4 Conclusion
The main advantage of using pricing pressure indices in the analysis of horizontal mergers in differ-
entiated product industries is that they focus the analysis on the most important aspects that determine
unilateral effects, namely diversion ratios, profit margins and merger-specific efficiencies. Furthermore,
they allow the analyst to avoid the market definition exercise, which is a major advantage since it is often
problematic to define the relevant market in differentiated product industries. Another advantage of these
indices is that they do not require any assumption on the shape of demand functions.
In this paper, we show how an analysis of likely unilateral effects of a horizontal merger can be
performed in a two-sided market. It turns out that additional complications such as feedback effects that
are due to the presence of indirect network effects arise. We show how these can be overcome.
Nevertheless, the general critique that applies to using pricing pressure indices in one-sided markets
remains valid. In particular, the fact that no assumption on demand systems are needed (which determines
pass-through) is because both UPP and GUPPI only calculate the incentive to unilaterally increase prices
post-merger, but not the actual price increase. However, what one is ultimately interested in is the change
in total welfare and consumer surplus due to the merger, which is determined by the merger-induced price
change (for example Schmalensee (2009) raises this point).
Furthermore, one of the main questions is whether UPP and GUPPI are feasible initial horizontal
merger screening devices. In order to calculate UPP and GUPPI, data on diversion ratios between merg-
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ing parties’ products as well as on margins are needed. Diversion ratios can best be obtained via customer
surveys. Sometimes conducting such a survey may not be feasible because it takes too much time or is
too expensive to implement in an initial screening period. In a two-sided market the survey would need
to be more comprehensive, as one would need to survey participants on both sides and ask them not only
how they would react to a price increase, but also how they would react to a change in participation on
the other side. This has already been done in practice, for instance in the Bloemenveiling Aalsmeer-
FloraHolland flower auction house merger24 and also in the merger between the Dutch yellow page di-
rectories25. However, the results were not used to calculate UPP at the time. A further complication is
that survey results are sensitive to the design of the survey. Finally, calculating margins requires not only
price data but also information on marginal (or at least average variable) costs, which is often difficult to
obtain at the initial screening stage (Bailey, Leonard, Olley, and Wu, 2010; Schmalensee, 2009; Werden
and Froeb, 2011).
Another shortcoming of UPP and GUPPI is that both indices ignore supply-side responses by com-
petitors. If the merging parties increase their prices post-merger, competitors have an incentive to also
increase their prices in response. This is turn gives the merging parties the incentive to raise prices fur-
ther. Hence, UPP and GUPPI tend to underestimates the incentive to increase prices post-merger in a
one-sided market. In a two-sided market, depending on the sign and size of the indirect network effects,
prices on one side might be strategic complements (as in one side markets) but also strategic substitutes
Fahri and Hagiu (2008). Therefore, UPP and GUPPI may either underestimate or overestimate the in-
centives to increase prices. Furthermore, both UPP and GUPPI do not account for possible repositioning
or entry post-merger (see for example Shapiro (1996) or Epstein and Rubinfeld (2010)).
Overall, it seems that all advantages and disadvantages of using UPP measures which have been
discussed for one-sided markets also apply to two-sided markets, with some of them being potentially
amplified. Still, using UPP measures has many advantages over conducting a full merger analysis, which
involves collecting even more data and making additional assumptions. Therefore, we conclude that
UPP is an especially useful device in the initial screening phase, which may be complemented with
conducting a full-fledged merger simulation at a later stage. Nonetheless, if one were to use UPP to
evaluate a merger, using one-sided formulas and disregarding the two-sided nature of the market might
lead to biased conclusions. In this paper, we have shown how one could overcome this by accounting for
the two-sidedness of the market.
24Case No 5901/184 Bloemenveiling Aalsmeer/FloraHolland [2007] NMa.
25Case 6246 European Directories/Truvo Nederland [2008] NMa.
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